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1.     Introduction 
Firm hierarchies are becoming flatter. Spans of control have broadened and the number of 
levels within firms has declined. These trends are suggested and documented in a number of 
academic papers (e.g., Osterman, 1996; and Whittington, et al., 1999; Rajan and Wulf, 2006) and 
are often discussed in the business press. However, much less is known about the causes behind 
these trends. In this paper, we investigate the role of changes in the firms’ product markets and, 
in particular, product market competition resulting from trade liberalization as a potential driver 
of organizational change.
1 In doing so, we shed some light on the possible reasons behind certain 
organizational choices and on the importance of communication and decision-making processes 
inside firms.  
Our main finding is that greater international competition following trade liberalization leads 
to flatter firms. U.S. firms in manufacturing industries more exposed to the trade liberalization 
reduce the number of hierarchical levels, broaden the span of control for the CEO, and increase 
total pay and incentive-based pay for division managers. Furthermore, firms appear to adjust 
organizational elements in a coordinated manner: certain changes appear to occur together.  
We use a unique panel dataset of the internal organization of large U.S. manufacturing firms 
in various industries. We exploit variation within firms (and within division manager positions) 
in an array of organizational variables -such as hierarchical depth, CEO span of control, pay and 
incentives- over a 14-year period. This allows us to address concerns about unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
                                                 
1The economic importance of organizational change is non-negligible since the internal hierarchy of the firm 
(Liberti, 2006; Garicano and Hubbard, 2007) and organizational and workplace practices (Black and Lynch, 2001) 
have a significant impact on productivity.  
   3
In order to identify a potential causal effect of foreign competition on organizational change, 
our primary identification strategy exploits the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 
1989 (FTA) that eliminated tariffs and trade barriers between the two countries (Trefler, 2004). 
This can be thought of as a quasi-natural experiment that implied a greater reduction in entry 
barriers (a larger increase in competition) for firms in industries with high U.S. tariffs on 
Canadian imports prior to 1989 allowing us to implement a difference-in-differences strategy.
 2 
Since the trade liberalization was bilateral, it also implied a reduction in Canadian tariffs on U.S. 
exports potentially leading to market expansion opportunities for our U.S. firms. However, while 
we find significant effects of these market expansion opportunities on other outcomes (such as 
firm size and market value), they had no significant impact on the firm’s hierarchy: all the effect 
is driven by the fall in import tariffs. Finally, we show that our results are not driven by 
alternative factors that could also lead to flattening, such as increases in expenditures on IT, 
changes in business scope, location of activities, and a host of other potential factors. 
Our findings suggest that it is the increased competition from falling U.S. tariffs that causes 
firms to simultaneously reorganize along several dimensions.. These results are consistent with 
theories arguing that complementarities exist among a firm’s organizational design elements 
(e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1995).  As such, our paper is related to the limited empirical research 
on the existence of complementary human resource management practices (e.g. Ichniowski, 
Shaw, and Prennushi, 1997; and Bresnahan, Brynjolfson, and Hitt, 2002; Cockburn, Henderson 
and Stern, 2004). Within this literature, an important contribution of our paper is that we show 
                                                 
2 When studying competition, it is important to exploit exogenous changes to entry barriers, instead of standard 
measures of product market competition, such as, industry Herfindahl indices and average price cost margins. These, 
as is well known, are subject to numerous concerns: they do not measure the underlying competition parameter (the 
entry barrier), they are endogenous to changes in the competitiveness of markets, and they are non-monotonic in 
competition (Sutton, 1991; Schmalensee, 1989).  
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that following an exogenous shock to the firm’s competitive environment firms redesign their 
organizations arguably to “fit” the environment in which they operate.
3 To our knowledge, much 
of the research on adoption of complementary work practices does not capture responses to 
exogenous shocks.
4 
While we establish a robust causal relationship between the trade liberalization and the 
flattening of firms, an important question remains: what is the economic mechanism driving this 
change? Management scholars have long argued that increased competition leads firms to search 
for new organizational practices in an attempt to replace traditional hierarchical structures. Since 
additional layers in the hierarchy impede information flows, firms eliminate layers (i.e., 
“delayer”) to improve response times to changes in competitive forces. Moreover, firms 
decentralize decision-making to respond more quickly to changes in the business environment 
and to exploit the knowledge of lower level managers.
5 Alternatively, in a world with X-
inefficiency, firms may eliminate layers in an attempt to cut costs when faced with more 
competition. We provide a set of additional results that explore the different potential 
mechanisms. Our findings show little support for the cost-cutting story and are more consistent 
with flattening as reflecting changes in decision-making in response to more competition. In this 
sense, we complement Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2007) who document a cross-sectional 
relationship between competition (measured by import penetration and survey responses) and 
greater decision-making authority of plant managers across countries.  
                                                 
3This idea is captured in the following quote:  “Achieving high performance in a business results from establishing 
and maintaining a fit among three elements: the strategy of the firm, its organizational design, and the environment 
in which it operates. (Roberts, 2004, pg. 12).   
4One exception, and relatedly, Baker and Hubbard (2004) document how an exogenous change in technology affects 
the ownership structure of trucking firms.  
5Refer to Whittington, Pettigrew, Peck, Fenton and Conyon (1999) for a review of the relevant literature in 
management. For early works that discuss the link between organizational change and the environment, refer to 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967).   5
There are certainly other reasons why firms may change their organizational structures. 
Information technology is a prominent candidate and a number of papers have explored the 
relationship between IT and organizational characteristics including work practices (Bresnahan, 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002), skill-biased organizational change (Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001), 
adoption of new management practices (Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw, 2007), firm boundaries 
(Baker and Hubbard, 2004) and delegation of authority (Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van 
Reenen and Zilibotti, 2007). Even though our main focus is whether there is a causal effect of 
changes in product markets on the observed flattening of firms, we acknowledge and address the 
importance of information technology in our analysis. 
Given that we find a significant effect from a specific trade liberalization, it is likely that 
increasing domestic and foreign competition from other sources (such as deregulation and 
reductions in trade, communication and transport costs) is also an important contributor to the 
flattening of firms. Analyzing these other drivers of increasing competition is beyond the scope 
of this paper. However, to the extent that one thinks that these are major forces, this paper is an 
important step in the understanding of the role of product markets in explaining organizational 
change. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the related theoretical 
literature on organizational design and discusses the potential links between the competitive 
environment, internal hierarchies, and managerial incentives.  Section 3 describes the data and 
our empirical strategy. Section 4 outlines our results and discusses potential interpretations. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical  Background   6
M-form organizations, as described and documented in the pioneering work of Alfred 
Chandler (1962), are comprised of a central administrative unit or “headquarters” and operating 
units or divisions. Economic models typically characterize headquarters (or the CEO) as the 
principal with the objective of maximizing firm profits and division managers as self-interested 
agents that are better informed about local markets. The optimal design of an organization 
depends on trade-offs associated with various characteristics such as information, incentives, and 
coordination which in turn are a function of the environment in which the firm operates (Roberts, 
2004).  
An external shock to the environment, such as an increase in the intensity of product market 
competition, can cause firms to reorganize along various dimensions. One traditional explanation 
is that firms are not optimizing and that competition forces firms to eliminate organizational 
slack or X-inefficiency (Liebenstein, 1966). However, explicit changes to organizational design 
need not be the result of earlier inefficient behavior, but could be an optimal response to the 
trade-offs inherent in distinct strategic and design choices. 
For example, under certain theories of hierarchies, firms have to trade-off adaptation and 
coordination: decentralized decision-making may replace centralized structures as quick 
adaptation to local markets becomes paramount. Yet, local decisions by autonomous business 
unit managers may be more costly for corporate headquarters to coordinate (e.g., Alonso, 
Dessein, and Matouschek, 2008). Firms may also trade-off loss of information and loss of 
control when making organizational decisions as the delegation of decision rights can encourage 
generation of higher quality information, but comes at a cost of lack of control (e.g., Aghion and 
Tirole, 1997). A further dimension that firms can optimize is the generation and processing of 
information. The elimination of management levels may facilitate faster and more accurate flow   7
of information throughout the hierarchy, but broader spans of control associated with fewer 
levels can lead to loss of control and the inability to process information by headquarters (e.g., 
Williamson, 1967). Firms also choose the appropriate level of incentive provision as the return to 
managerial effort increases: the optimal performance-pay sensitivity depends on the 
characteristics of the environment (Raith, 2003).  
Finally, decentralization and incentive provision may also interact (e.g., Mookerjee, 2006) 
and decentralized decision-making can be coupled with higher performance pay to appropriately 
align incentives (e.g., Prendergast, 2002; Wulf, 2007). However, local incentives can be costly as 
they fail to realize synergies across business units (e.g. Athey and Roberts, 2001).
 6   
But beyond making explicit the existence of a series of trade-offs facing firms, an important 
result of organizational theory highlights the interactions and potential complementarities among 
different subsets of organizational design choices. Milgrom and Roberts (1995) analyze 
complementarities among different features of modern production technologies, while 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) examine levels of incentives to elicit effort for various tasks and 
the interactions among incentives, asset ownership and job restrictions. Other more recent papers 
include Friebel and Raith (2007), Dessein, Garicano and Gertner (2007) and Athey and Roberts 
(2001), each of which examines the determination of incentives and decision-making authority 
from various perspectives.  
As a consequence of changes in the competitive environment, firms are likely to face 
different costs and benefits of various trade-offs. This will cause firms to adjust their set of 
                                                 
6There is a growing theoretical literature in economics that relates to each of these features. Several models explore 
the role of a hierarchy in enabling a firm to process and communicate information among agents (e.g. Radner, 1993; 
Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994; Garicano, 2000).  More recent research focuses on the trade-off between information 
and authority or control (e.g. Aghion and Tirole, 1997 and Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek, 2008). The early 
theoretical work which is less central to this paper considers hierarchies as a means to create incentives (e.g. Lazear 
and Rosen, 1981), to supervise workers (e.g. Williamson, 1967; Calvo and Wellisz, 1978) or to assign talent (e.g. 
Rosen, 1982).      8
complementary organizational practices including, but not limited to, the location of decision 
rights, the layers in a hierarchy, and the design of incentives. Rantakari (2008) models these 
choices and makes predictions about interactions among different organizational design 
parameters and the joint fit with the volatility of the firm’s environment.  
Other related work that explicitly links product market competition to the internal 
organization of firms is Marin and Verdier (2003). They develop a model of hierarchies based on 
Aghion and Tirole (1997) and show that greater international competition leads to a delegation of 
authority from the CEO to the managers.
7 In addition to altering the location of decision rights, 
increased competition is likely to change the importance of incentives provided through pay 
independently of the effect on hierarchies (e.g. Raith, 2003; Cuñat and Guadalupe, 2006).   
In sum, the effect of competition on various organizational choices—hierarchy, location of 
decision rights, and performance pay--is ultimately an empirical issue.  
Of course there are other explanations besides intensified competition for the flattening of 
firms, the most obvious being the rise of information technology.  Managers receive, process, 
and transmit information, and improvements in the technology of communication and 
computation may directly affect organizational design and may have differential effects in more 
competitive environments. For example, improvements in communication technology may allow 
more efficient processing of information thereby increasing spans of control, and this effect may 
be more pronounced in competitive environments in which quick decision-making is essential. 
As discussed in the introduction, a number of empirical papers demonstrate that IT is an 
                                                 
7Askenazy, Thesmar and Thoenig (2006) consider how new technologies increase the value of innovation which 
causes firms to design more “reactive” organizations. Thesmar and Thoenig (2000) show that an increase in the rate 
of creative destruction (the arrival of new products) has an impact on organizational choice. Finally, Conconi, 
Legros and Newman (2008) develop a trade model to examine how liberalization affects the ownership structure of 
firms.   9
important determinant of organizational design and we will address its role in our empirical 
analysis.  
Finally, increased competition can affect organizational design through many channels, 
including, but not limited to: changes in business scope, the reduction of organizational slack (or 
X-inefficiency), and outsourcing or offshoring. While it is beyond the scope of the paper to 
consider each of these various channels, we will attempt to consider several of these mechanisms 
in our empirical specifications.   
3.  Data and Empirical Strategy  
3.1   Organizational Data 
The primary dataset from which we draw our sample is an unbalanced cross-industry panel 
of more than 300 publicly traded U.S. firms over the years 1986-1999.  This dataset includes 
detailed information on job descriptions, titles, reporting relationships, and reporting levels of 
senior and middle management positions. The dataset is rather unique because it allows us to 
identify changes in hierarchies within firms over a 14-year period that is characterized by 
significant organizational change. 
The data are collected from a confidential compensation survey conducted by Hewitt 
Associates, a leading human resources consulting firm specializing in executive compensation 
and benefits.  The survey is the largest private compensation survey (as measured by the number 
of participating firms).  The survey participants are typically the leaders in their sectors and the 
survey sample is most representative of Fortune 500 firms.  For a more detailed description of 
the data and their representativeness, see Rajan and Wulf (2006). 
An observation in the dataset is a managerial position within a firm in a year.
  This includes 
both operational positions (e.g., Chief Operations Officer and Division Managers) and senior   10
staff positions (e.g., Chief Financial Officer and General or Legal Counsel). The data for each 
position include all components of compensation including salary, actual bonus, and grants of 
restricted stock, stock options, and other forms of long-term incentives (e.g., performance 
units)
8;  as well as position-specific characteristics such as job title, the title of the position that 
the job reports to (i.e., the position’s boss), number of positions between the position and the 
CEO in the organizational hierarchy, and both the incumbent’s status as a corporate officer and 
tenure in position. 
We analyze changes in organizational structure by focusing on two characteristics: breadth 
and depth of the hierarchy.  These can be defined consistently across firms and over time and 
reflect important information about two important positions in the hierarchy, namely the division 
manager and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). We also analyze changes in division manager 
pay—both levels and performance sensitivity.   
Our first measure, span, is a firm-level measure that captures a horizontal dimension or 
breadth of the hierarchy. It measures CEO span of control and is defined as the number of 
positions reporting directly to the CEO. One obvious question when using this variable is:  what 
information is reflected in a direct reporting relationship to the CEO?  First, the CEO should 
have direct authority over the manager in the position (i.e., his subordinate). Second, presumably 
the exchange of information between the CEO and the manager is more direct than it would be if 
the “chain of command” included other intermediary positions. Since the CEO is at the top of the 
lines of authority and communication, his job involves decision-making at the highest level, but 
also includes a role as coordinator of information and decisions that are associated with a 
complex, multidivisional firm.  
                                                 
8The Hewitt database is thus far more comprehensive than the SEC filings which form the basis for the ExecuComp 
database. Because firms are required to only file information on the top five executive officers, information on 
division managers is rarely included in these sources.    11
Our other measure, depth, is defined at the division level and represents a vertical dimension, 
or steepness, of the hierarchy. It is defined as the number of positions between the CEO and the 
division manager. Division managers (DM) are the highest authority in the division, where a 
division is defined as “the lowest level of profit center responsibility for a business unit that 
engineers, manufactures and sells its own products.” We focus on the division manager position 
for two reasons:  (i) it is the position furthest down the hierarchy that is most consistently defined 
across firms; and (ii) it is informative about the extent to which responsibility is delegated in the 
firm.   
Figure 1 displays an example of a hierarchy that demonstrates both measures of span and 
depth.  In this example, the measure of span equals 4 -- there are four positions reporting directly 
to the CEO -- and the measure of depth equals 2 — there are two positions between the CEO and 
the division manager. Average span increased from 4.5 positions in 1986 to 7 positions in 1999 
and average depth fell from around 1.5 to 1. 
In this paper, we focus on the subset of firms that operate in the manufacturing sector for 
which we have data on tariffs. This leads to a sample of approximately 1962 firm-years and 5702 
division-years that includes 230 firms and 1524 divisions. We will report both firm-level 
regressions (span of control is a firm level variable) and division-level regressions (division 
depth and division manager pay will vary by division within the firm).  
We also have information on division level sales and employment and the above data are 
supplemented with financial information from Compustat. Finally, we construct a number of 
variables that are used as controls and that we will describe in the results section (see Table A3 
on how these are built). 
3.2  Product Market Changes: The 1989 Canada U.S. Free Trade Agreement    12
In January 1989, U.S. President Reagan and Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney signed the 
Canada U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to eliminate trade barriers, and in particular, all tariffs 
between Canada and the United States. In October 1987, when the details of the agreement were 
first revealed, they encountered substantial opposition in Canada. By early 1988, the Liberal 
Party announced that it would use its majority in the Senate to block passage of the free trade 
agreement until Canadian voters decided the agreement's fate in a general election. The Liberal 
party had an advantage of 20 points in the polls over the Conservative party. The highly 
contested election took place in October 1988 with a narrow Conservative victory. Three months 
later the agreement came into effect and the first round of tariff reductions took place. 
The advantages of this turn of events for our empirical strategy are threefold (see discussion 
in Trefler, 2004). Since the passage of the agreement was highly improbable and unexpected, it 
can be interpreted as an exogenous shock. Furthermore, it was not a response to a 
macroeconomic shock, but rather to the lack of progress in the Tokyo round, so that it was 
unaccompanied by other economic packages that could affect industries simultaneously. Finally, 
there were no other important trade agreements during that period so that the shock to trade with 
Canada is unlikely to be confounded with other factors. 
This reduction of U.S. tariffs on imports from Canadian firms affected a substantial fraction 
of U.S. trade since the U.S.-Canada trade relationship is the world’s largest in volume and 
Canadian imports represented an average of 20% of total U.S. imports at the time (in comparison 
to Mexico at around 5%). In addition, Canada is similar to the U.S. in terms of product 
specialization, so that Canadian products are likely to compete directly with U.S. products. In 
fact, Head and Ries (2001) estimate the elasticity of substitution between U.S. and Canadian 
goods at approximately 8, suggesting a potentially large response of Canadian imports from the   13
tariff reductions. They also document substantial trade-distorting non-tariff barriers suggesting a 
potentially even larger effect from the trade liberalization. Below we discuss the effect the 
liberalization had on North-American trade. 
In order to evaluate the effect of the trade agreement on organizational change, we exploit the 
fact that U.S. firms in industries with high tariffs on Canadian imports prior to 1989 suffered a 
bigger ‘competitive shock’ following the liberalization than firms facing low tariffs. We define 
s AvT89  to measure the level of exposure of the firm to the liberalization. This is the average 
tariff on Canadian imports by industry s for the period between 1986 and 1988 (Feenstra et al., 
1996),
9 where tariffs are defined as duty divided by customs value by 4 digit SIC (or 3 digit SIC) 
by year, and we take the average of the three years before 1989.
10 Our dependent variables are a 
set of organizational variables  dst ORG  by division d (or firm), industry s and year t. For example, 
division-level depth, division manager pay, and CEO span of control (defined at the firm level), 
such that our basic empirical specification is as follows: 
(1) 
Where  s AvT89  is the level of tariffs on Canadian imports in the industry pre-89,  t Post89  is 
a dummy that equals one after 1989,  dst X  are division (or firms) characteristics such as size, 
t d are year dummies,  d η  are division fixed effects that absorb any permanent cross-sectional 
division/firm/industry differences  and  dst ε  is an error term. This is a standard quasi-difference in 
differences specification that exploits the trade liberalization, where  s AvT89  (the “treatment”) is 
continuous. The coefficient of interest,  3 θ , captures the differential effect of the liberalization on 
                                                 
9 The data are available from http://www.internationaldata.org/ in the “1972-2001 U.S. import data”.  
10We report the average tariff by industry (3 digit SIC) for firms in our sample and list examples of Canadian firms 
operating in these industries (see Tables S1 and S2 in the Supplemental Appendix). Unfortunately, we do not have 
non-tariff barriers, however to the extent that these are correlated with tariffs, we can interpret the tariff effect as the 
overall trade-liberalization effect (Trefler, 2004). 
dst d d t dst t s dst t d X Post AvT ORG ε η η β θ + + + + + = * ' 89 * 89 3  14
firms according to their trade exposure prior to 1989, net of the general change post 1989 and net 
of possible permanent differences  across industries.
11 Finally, we also include division specific 
trends in the organizational variable,  d η *t. 
One concern in estimating equation (1) is that our organizational variables—both span and 
depth--exhibit a strong trend over time (as suggested in Figures 2 & 3) leading to autocorrelated 
errors. Not surprisingly, a test of autocorrelation strongly rejects the null of no autocorrelation, 
even when allowing for division-specific time trends (F statistic of 431.2). This implies that the 
fixed effects (within) estimation is inefficient. We estimate equation (1) in first-differences, since 
this removes the autocorrelation (F statistic of 2.6), and thus is the efficient estimator in this case. 
Furthermore, since  s AvT89  is defined at the industry level, we cluster standard errors by four 
digit SIC in all specifications to allow for correlation across observations within an industry. 
A.  Validity of the trade liberalization as a “Quasi-natural experiment” 
We argued earlier that the agreement itself was largely unexpected and therefore one can 
consider it as an exogenous shock to the different industries. In order to make sure that there are 
no differential pre-existing trends in organizational variables that are correlated with tariff 
levels, we include division trends. We will also run a “placebo” test on the main specification, to 
assess potential anticipation effects of the liberalization. A potential source of endogeneity is the 
phase-out schedule of the tariffs. Some tariff reductions took effect immediately, while others 
were scheduled to be phased out over a period of five or ten years. Since that choice is 
                                                 
11 Firms and divisions are assigned the industry reported as the firm’s primary four digit SIC in the first year they 
appear in the sample using historic SICs. This industry classification is not allowed to vary over time since these 
changes are endogenous and we use three digit SICs if four digit SICs are not reported. 70% of the firms in the 
sample appear before 1989; for those that appear after, we keep the first SIC reported. We conduct a series of 
robustness tests using a variety of methods in classifying the industry or industries in which a firm operates.    15
endogenous and subject to lobbying, we treat all industries equally regardless of their phase-out 
schedule.
12 
But even if the implementation of the agreement was unexpected, and if we do not allow for 
endogenous phase-out of tariffs to identify our results, we still need to address the fact that the 
pre-89 level of tariffs is not necessarily random. We do this in two different ways. Trefler (2004) 
argues that one source of tariff endogeneity is that declining industries may have high tariff 
levels. He addresses this concern by controlling for industry specific trends. We address this 
concern by controlling for division specific time trends ( t d * η ) that absorb the industry secular 
trends. We further control for other pre-existing industry characteristics that are typically related 
to tariff protection: skill intensity, capital intensity and TFP growth of U.S. industries. The 
vector s Z  includes the averages of each of these measures by industry before the FTA (between 
1986 and 1988). Analogous to our tariff measure, we also allow organizational change to vary 
along these dimensions after 1989 through the interaction term  ) 89 * ( t s Post Z . 
Once we include these variables and take first differences, the regression we estimate is: 
     (2) 
B.  Economic Significance of the FTA for U.S. firms 
A final question before we proceed to the results is to what extent we could expect the FTA 
to significantly affect U.S. firms. Clausing (2001) studies the FTA using disaggregated data at 
the commodity level (10 digit product categories) and finds that the increase in U.S. imports 
from Canada was larger the larger the tariff reduction (the higher the pre-1989 tariff). For 
imports that saw a tariff reduction in excess of 5%, trade doubled in size between 1989 and 1994 
and over half of the $42 billion increase in imports from Canada between 1989 and 1994 was the 
                                                 
12 We also run a robustness check that shows that the effect of the liberalization on organizational change was larger 
in industries with faster reductions in tariffs. 
dst t s d t dst t s dst Post Z d X Post AvT ORG ε ϕ η β θ Δ + Δ + + Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ )' 89 * ( ' 89 * 89 3  16
result of the trade agreement. Head and Ries (2001) and Romalis (2007) also find a sizable effect 
of the tariff reductions on trade volumes.  
So, overall the trade liberalization increased bilateral trade flows and import penetration, 
13 
which is consistent with an increase in competitive pressure for firms on both sides of the border. 
In fact, there is substantial micro-econometric work documenting the effect of the FTA on 
Canadian firms. For example, Trefler (2004) finds a substantial increase in labor productivity of 
Canadian companies following the agreement. Further, the paper finds that the reduction in U.S. 
tariffs on exports from Canada led to a 6 % expansion of the most productive, export-oriented 
plants (and to a contraction of the most import-competing). This suggests that the liberalization 
allowed them to expand production, increase sales to the larger U.S. market, and move down 
their average cost curve.  
Regarding the effect of the FTA on U.S. firms, Feinberg and Keane (2006) study the 
import/export behavior of U.S. multinationals (and their Canadian subsidiaries) and show that 
the reduction in tariffs led to a substantial increase in arms-length exports of U.S. multinationals 
to Canada (20% increase) and of their Canadian subsidiaries to the U.S. (29.8% increase). They 
also find increases in U.S. domestic sales and employment for these firms. Changes in tariffs 
explain most of the change in arms-length trade, but not changes in intra-firm trade (trade 
between affiliates and their U.S. parents). 
In this study, we also found a significant effect of the FTA on firms in our sample (Table 
A1). In fact, we found a qualitatively different response to U.S. tariff reductions (that implied 
more import competition) than to Canadian tariff reductions (that presented more export 
opportunities). Using the same specification as in equation (2), we found that reductions in U.S. 
                                                 
13 The evidence on whether the increase in trade was at the expense of trade with other countries is more mixed: 
Clausing (2001) and Head and Ries (2001) find no evidence of trade diversion, but Romalis (2007) does. 
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tariffs on Canadian imports led to reductions in average price-cost margin for our firms 
suggesting a significant negative effect of competition on accounting measures. However, we 
found no significant changes on market value (excess returns) or employment. On the other 
hand, Canadian tariff reductions
14 did raise firm employment and excess market returns (and had 
no effect on price-cost margins), which is consistent with the market expansion interpretation 
and with earlier results by Feinberg and Keane (2001, 2006).
 Even though a thorough analysis of 
the effect of the liberalization on productivity and the profitability of U.S. firms is beyond the 
scope of this paper, the overall evidence suggests that the FTA led to greater competitive 
pressure from the reduction in U.S. tariffs, but also increased opportunities for market expansion 
from Canadian tariff reduction. Next, we assess the organizational response to the liberalization. 
4. Results   
4.1  Trade Liberalization and the Flattening Firm: Changes in Division Depth and CEO 
Span of Control 
In this section, we focus on the effect of the trade liberalization on changes in division depth 
and CEO span of control as the main organizational variables. In a subsequent section, we will 
explore how other aspects of organizations (in particular, levels of pay and incentive 
compensation for division managers) are also changing over time in order to provide a fuller 
picture of organizational change and to explore the possible mechanisms by which these changes 
occur.  
Before turning to the regression results, let us begin by discussing Figures 2 and 3 that show 
the main variation that we exploit in our empirical analysis. We divide firms and divisions 
                                                 
14 This is the average Canadian tariff by 4 digit SIC (3 where 4 is missing) on US exports, measured as the mean 
tariff between 1986 and 1989 (computed in an analogous way to U.S. AvT89). The data on Canadian tariffs are from 
Trefler (2004), and we use a converter provided by the author to convert Canadian industry codes into US SIC 
codes.   18
according to whether the firm is in an industry with a tariff above or below the median tariff pre-
1989. We plot the average span (Figure 2) and depth (Figure 3) by year for the two subgroups. 
While we observe trending in organizational variables in both groups, there is a distinct 
difference in the change in trend after 1989 between the groups. Firms in high tariff industries 
increase their span by more and decrease depth by more after the trade liberalization in 
comparison to firms in low tariff industries. The patterns suggest that firms in industries facing 
increased competition alter the shape of their organizational hierarchy--greater span and 
decreased depth.
 15 These graphs restrict the sample to firms that are present in the data before 
1989 to avoid compositional changes driving these patterns (we observe even starker patterns in 
the whole sample). While the figures depict raw differences in organizational change of firms in 
industries facing different competitive shocks, they do not take into account firm or division 
characteristics, unobserved heterogeneity, or the overall time trend. For this, we turn to our 
regression analysis. 
Clearly, changes in span and depth are correlated. As division managers get closer to the top 
of the hierarchy and are more likely to report directly to the CEO, span increases.
16 In Tables 2 
and 3, we report our results of the effect of the FTA on division depth and CEO span of control 
respectively. The tables have a similar structure with specifications reported in roughly the same 
order. Since these organizational variables are related, we will describe and discuss our findings 
for both depth and span in parallel to provide a more coherent picture. In the depth regressions 
                                                 
15 In the Figure S1 in the Supplemental Appendix, we illustrate an example of the changes in a firm’s hierarchy pre- 
and post-FTA. This firm operated in the textile manufacturing industry which faced average Canadian tariffs on US 
imports of 8.8%. The firm flattened through the elimination of an intermediary position (Chief Operating Officer) 
and in the process moved the division manager positions one level closer to the CEO. As a result, span increased 
from 5 to 7 and average depth decreased from 2 to 1.  
16 In Section 3 and Table S5 of the Supplemental Appendix, we show that this relationship is not simply a 
mechanical one.     19
(Table 2) the unit of observation is the division-year (there are 1524 divisions in the data); while 
in the span regressions (Table 3), it is the firm-year (230 firms).
17  
All regressions follow the structure of equation (2) and include year dummies and controls 
for firm size (as the natural logarithm of sales) and the endogeneity of tariffs through interactions 
of industry characteristics (skill intensity, capital intensity and TFP growth) with a post 89 
dummy.  Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. The regressions also account for 
permanent unobserved heterogeneity (firm or division) that might bias our estimates. This is a 
big advantage of this dataset, in that the estimates are exclusively identified from within firm 
variation in their exposure to the FTA (and not from differences across firms). 
The coefficient of interest is the interaction of the average tariff in the industry before the 
1989 FTA with a post 89 dummy (variable AvT89*Post89). The agreement specified that all 
tariffs be eliminated (within a time frame) after 1989. As such, we expect the agreement to 
reflect a greater increase in competitive pressure (i.e., a larger fall in entry barriers) in industries 
with high tariffs relative to low tariff industries.  
The main results are shown in column 1 of Tables 2 and 3. In column 1 of Table 2 (depth) 
the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that 
firms in industries with higher tariffs prior to the trade liberalization decreased division depth 
more over the period as their product markets faced greater competition due to a decline in 
tariffs. A firm in an industry with average U.S. tariffs on Canadian imports (4 %) decreased 
division depth by 0.146 positions following the trade liberalization (3.661*0.04). This represents 
                                                 
17 It is important to run the depth regressions at the division level –instead of averaging by firm- in order to look at 
changes of the same division over time, and to be able to control for division size. Given that the coverage of 
divisions within a firm can fluctuate (firms do not report all divisions in the data), changes in average depth within 
firms may be capturing compositional changes. We also checked whether the coverage of divisions (as the fraction 
of total sales represented by the divisions in the sample out of total firm sales as reported by Compustat) changed 
with the experiment, and found that it did not (column 1 Table S3 in the Supplemental Appendix).    20
11.2 % of average depth in the sample. One way to interpret the magnitude of this effect is to 
imagine a firm with six division managers each with one position between them and the CEO 
(i.e., depth of 1). Following the trade liberalization, a firm with average tariffs would move one 
of the six division managers to report directly to the CEO. Since this only requires a change in 
the level of reporting for a subset of the divisions, it is relatively easy to implement and, as we 
will show, most of the change occurs within the first year. 
Turning to span of control, in Table 3 column 2, we find a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient suggesting that firms increase span of control more in response to a greater 
fall in tariffs in their industries. A firm with average tariffs before 1989 increased span by 0.324 
positions following the trade liberalization (8.106*0.04), or 6 % of average span in the sample. 
This implies that one of every three firms in our sample increased the CEO’s span of control by 
one position.   
In Table 2 (depth) columns 2 through 10, we also control for division specific time trends 
and for division size (the log of division employment). We lose around 700 observations where 
division employment is missing, but this does not substantially alter the results. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, larger firms have greater depth and larger divisions within firms are closer to the 
top. Controlling for division employment also allows us to indirectly control for the potential 
down-sizing of divisions due to outsourcing, or off-shoring of certain activities, since this would 
possibly lead to a reduction in employment. The stability of the main coefficient of interest 
suggests that outsourcing is unlikely to be driving our main findings. Even conditional on 
division size, we find that divisions in firms more affected by the FTA repositioned their DMs 
closer to the top of the hierarchy.   21
Column 2 of Table 3 (span) controls for firm specific time trends, and we obtain a similar 
though slightly larger effect than in column 1 (coefficient of 9.9 instead of 8.1).  This indicates 
that the result is not driven by pre-existing trends in span that may have pre-dated the 
liberalization agreement.
18  
Next, since the trade liberalization implied not only a fall in U.S. tariffs on Canadian imports, 
but also a reduction of Canadian tariffs on U.S. exports, we allow for an effect of this second 
aspect of the liberalization. Column 3 includes an interaction of the average Canadian tariff on 
U.S. exports with a post 1989 dummy (labeled as Export AvT89 and defined in an analogous 
way to U.S. AvT89). The effect is positive for depth and negative for span, suggesting that on 
average the market expansion possibilities given by easier exporting to Canada by U.S. firms led 
to increases in depth and decreases in span, relative to the trend. This is the opposite effect of 
what we find for import tariffs, and since this effect is never statistically significant, it seems that 
increasing competitive pressure leads firms to flatten rather than greater export opportunities.  
What might explain this? One explanation is that the Canadian market is small relative to the 
U.S. market, so that the market expansion opportunities are not substantial. But this is unlikely 
since we do find that employment and market value increased significantly for these firms (Table 
A1). Alternatively, to the extent that market expansion does not generate competitive pressure, it 
may lead to other types of organizational changes different from those that we can identify in our 
data. 
                                                 
18 Since the increase in the number of direct reports may come from senior officer positions as well as from lower 
level managers, and since the presence of the Chief Operating Officer (COO) has decreased substantially over the 
sample period, we also controlled for the presence of a COO and a Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) that may 
report directly to the CEO. We found that the effect of the liberalization is slightly reduced suggesting that the 
estimated increase in span also includes other senior officer positions as well as managers traditionally lower in the 
hierarchy (unreported).    22
For the remaining columns in both Tables 2 and 3, we explore the robustness of the main 
results to the inclusion of a number of controls and to alternative explanations. Column 4 
provides a test of the main specification, specifically the assumption that the shock was 
unanticipated. We replace the Post 89 dummy in AvT*Post89 with a post 1988 dummy variable 
and keep the same set of controls (this is a standard placebo test for differences in differences). If 
the liberalization was anticipated, or if there was a pre-existing trend, then this new variable 
would pick up what we argue is a discrete “shock” before it occurred. But, the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant in both tables, lending credibility to the fact that the liberalization was 
truly unanticipated and that firms only started to respond after 1989.  
In column 5 of both tables, we further analyze the timing of the effect by considering if there 
was a lag in the firm’s response or if some of the change occurred around the time of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since NAFTA did not alter trade agreements 
between Canada and the U.S. (it was only an extension to Mexico), we expect it to have a 
negligible effect. To test this, we include an interaction of the average tariff between 1990 and 
1993 with a post-94 dummy variable (AvT94*Post94). This captures the differential effect of 
NAFTA across firms operating in industries with different levels of protection after 1989, but 
before 1994. We find statistically insignificant coefficients on both the interaction term 
associated with the 1994 experiment and on the lagged term. These findings suggest that most of 
the effect came from the 1989 agreement. The absence of an effect for the 1994 experiment is 
also consistent with the fact that there were no radical changes in the tariff agreements of 
NAFTA with respect to Canada. Furthermore, it suggests that we are not just capturing a 
spurious time trend. If it was spurious, the 1994 experiment coefficient should be significant, 
particularly since substantial flattening occurred during the late 1990s. We also allow for a   23
lagged effect of the 1989 experiment and find that it is not significant suggesting that most of the 
organizational change occurs within the first year. This is not particularly surprising given that 
changes in the level of reporting don’t have large implementation costs. 
All the results above are based on average U.S. tariffs on Canadian imports in the firm’s 
primary 4 digit SIC code (3 digit if reported at 3 digits) in which the firm operated before 1989. 
We use the industry classification that is reported prior to the trade liberalization to isolate the 
effect from endogenous changes in the main industry reported. Since our sample is comprised of 
multidivisional firms that typically operate in different industries and may change industry focus 
over time, we analyze the effect of the trade liberalization on a number of sub-samples to assess 
the validity of the main results.  
For firms that operate in more than one industry, there may be considerable noise in the 
industry tariff measure as a proxy for the change in competition that a firm faces. To address this 
concern, instead of using industry tariffs of the firm’s primary SIC code, we construct a firm-
specific measure that recognizes the firm’s business mix.  We use the weighted average of U.S. 
tariffs for the industries in which the firm operates before the liberalization, where the weights 
are the fraction of sales of each of the firm’s segments (as reported in 1988 from Compustat 
segment data). The weights are kept constant over the sample period to avoid endogeneity in 
choice of industry (for the same reason we kept the primary SIC constant). This comes at a cost 
in that, if segment data are noisy, the weights will be as well and this could induce measurement 
error. We report the results based on this firm-specific tariff measure in column 6 of both tables. 
The estimated effect is approximately 14 to 20 % larger for depth and span respectively and still 
statistically significant (although the standard errors are larger, and there is no statistical 
difference from the main effect).    24
Relatedly, we might expect industry tariffs to be a more precise measure of competition for 
firms that report their industry at a lower level of aggregation (i.e., 4 digit SIC codes instead of 3 
or 2). When we restrict the sample to firms that report a 4 digit SIC, we find a larger and more 
precisely estimated main effect (unreported). Finally, in column 7 in both tables, we restrict the 
sample to firms that report the same SIC throughout the sample period. In these regressions, 
since we exclude firms that may have endogenously changed their primary industry of 
operations, we would expect tariff reductions to more closely approximate actual changes in 
competition. This should lead to larger and more precisely estimated effects and this is exactly 
what we find in column 7 in both tables.
19 
Overall, we find convincing evidence that the effect of the trade liberalization on the 
flattening of firms took place around the 1989 period, that the liberalization was unanticipated, 
and that the effect was larger in industries where we have better measures of changes in 
competition. To reiterate the main findings: we find systematic evidence that U.S. firms, in 
response to trade liberalization with Canada, flattened the structure of their organizations. They 
reduced division depth by moving division managers closer to the top of the hierarchy and they 
increased the CEO span of control.
 20 Next we consider two important alternative explanations 
that could affect our main results. 
                                                 
19 Further robustness checks of the main results are presented in Table S4 in the Supplemental Appendix (depth in 
Panel A and span in Panel B). The results are similar if we restrict the sample to firms that are present in the sample 
before 1989 (column 1), if we include all services firms in the estimation as a control group (with average tariff 
AvT89 of zero, column 2) and when controlling for fluctuations in the exchange rate that may differentially affect 
industries with different levels of import penetration (column 3). The magnitude of the effect is larger when we 
restrict the sample to firms: (i) with no Canadian subsidiaries (column 4), and (ii) with a faster scheduled reduction 
in tariffs (column 5).  
20 One could also wonder to what extent these effects are restricted to the FTA, or if they generalize to other 
measures of competition. In fact, we also found evidence that division depth and CEO span significantly respond to 
other standard measures of competitive pressure (Table A2). We found that higher competition as reflected in lower 
trade costs (defined as tariffs plus transport costs, columns 1 and 4), a lower industry Lerner Index (columns 2 and 
5) or higher import penetration (columns 3 and 6) significantly reduces depth and increases CEO span of control 
(although for the latter, only the trade costs variable is significant). While these measures can be subject to many   25
One frequent reason for why firms change their organizations is explained by changes in firm 
leadership. Very often reorganizations come about when the CEO is replaced. In column 8 in 
both tables, we address this question by including a dummy variable that controls for a change in 
CEO. We find that depth decreases by 0.182 positions (division managers move closer to the 
top) in the event of a change in the CEO, and that span increases by 0.446 positions. The effect is 
highly statistically significant for both depth and span and contributes substantially to the R-
squared of both regressions. However, the point estimate of the coefficient on AvT89*Post89 
hardly changes (from 3.5 to 3.3 for depth and no change for span) and is estimated with similar 
precision, suggesting that the trade liberalization has an independent effect on organizational 
change that is distinct from CEO turnover. We also checked whether the probability of a CEO 
change increased with the liberalization, with positive but statistically insignificant results 
(column 2 Table S3 in the Supplemental Appendix). 
Finally, we try to consider the relevance of IT as a driver of organizational change. The mere 
availability of IT and falling IT prices should not be a problem for our identification since the 
availability of IT was similar across industries and our experiment exploits the differential effect 
across industries after 1989. However, to the extent that firms in different industries adopt IT in 
similar ways, we control for two types of IT investment at the industry level:  total IT in column 
9 (includes hardware, software and communications) and communication technology (CT) in 
column 10 of Table 2. These are defined as the investment in IT (CT) capital stock at the 2-digit 
SIC industry level based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (refer to Table 
A3 for specifics). The data are very aggregated relative to what one would require for a 
                                                                                                                                                             
criticisms and are by no means exogenous –that is why we use the FTA as our core specification- they provide 
evidence consistent with the main result in this paper: that flattening is a response to competitive pressure.   26
conclusive analysis, however, they allow us to evaluate the robustness of our main results to 
investments in information technology. We find that our coefficient of interest is unaffected.  
Regarding the coefficient on overall IT in column 9 in both tables, we find it is positive for 
both depth and span suggesting that increases in IT are associated with deeper organizations and 
wider spans of control. However, both coefficients are statistically insignificant. When we 
exclusively focus on the communications component of IT (Table 2 column 10), we find a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient in the depth regression (but, insignificant for span 
(unreported)). This suggests that firms in industries that are investing in IT and, in particular CT, 
are steeper (Garicano, 2000). Therefore the effect on delayering of more IT (CT) goes in the 
opposite direction to the competition effect that we have shown in this study. While these results 
are only suggestive, and while a more detailed analysis of IT and hierarchical change is needed, 
it is unlikely that the effect we are capturing with the FTA is due to IT.  
Overall, we find systematic evidence that firms experiencing a larger shock following the 
trade liberalization (those in more protected industries prior to 1989) reduced division depth and 
increased CEO span of control more relative to firms less affected by the liberalization.
 This 
effect is robust to a number of specifications and implies that, on average, the trade liberalization 
led U.S. manufacturing firms to flatten. 
4.2    Why Are Firms Flattening? 
The previous results show that the trade liberalization partially explains some of the 
flattening of US firms—both the increased span of control of the CEO and the decreased depth 
of division managers (or the delayering of levels in the hierarchy). Arguably, they represent 
causal estimates of an exogenous shock to the product market that go beyond the simple 
correlations of prior research. However, even though they capture a significant causal effect, they   27
are silent on the reasons for why firms alter their organizational structure and what the flattening 
actually means. While it is difficult to identify precise channels for the causal mechanism, in the 
next three sub-sections we attempt to shed some light on this issue. We explore several possible 
explanations including simple cost-cutting, changes in decision-making, and changes in firm 
scope.  
4.2.1   Division Manager (DM) Compensation and Incentives 
As shown earlier, following the trade liberalization, division managers are closer to the CEO 
in the organizational hierarchy. One possible explanation is that this may reflect the increased 
responsibility of division managers (DM) and potentially greater delegation of authority as an 
optimal response to competition (consistent with Marin and Verdier, 2003). Strictly speaking, 
our depth measure reflects “number of reporting levels” without any information on the actual 
role of the DM or the decisions they make. However, by looking at DM compensation and the 
importance of performance pay in their contracts, we can potentially infer a difference in job 
scope.
 21 
The first four columns in Table 4 show the effect of the liberalization on the level of pay and 
on DM incentives based on division-level performance. The dependent variable is the logarithm 
of division manager total compensation. Total pay for DMs is the sum of salary, bonus, and 
long-term compensation.
22 The regressions are again as in equation (2). Column 1 shows that 
                                                 
21  One concern is that the notion of a division varies across firms and what we are picking up in our pay regressions 
is either just differences in a firm’s definition of a division or differences in firm compensation policies.  Since we 
have division fixed effects, permanent cross-sectional differences in how firms define a division will not affect our 
estimates.  Moreover, the results are robust to controlling for division depth. 
22 The value of the long-term compensation includes restricted stock, stock options and other components of long-
term incentives and is determined by a modified version of Black-Scholes that is computed by Hewitt Associates 
and therefore is consistent across firms and over time.  Stock options are valued using a modified version of Black-
Scholes that takes into account vesting and termination provisions in addition to the standard variables of interest 
rates, stock price volatility, and dividends.  As is standard practice among compensation consulting firms, the other 
components of long-term incentives (i.e. restricted stock, performance units and performance shares) are valued   28
higher competitive pressure leads to higher total pay within the division (it includes division 
fixed effects). That is, the same DM position earns higher total pay after the competitive shock. 
Division managers in industries with average tariffs pre-1989 received a 7.0% increase 
(1.751*0.04) in total compensation after the trade liberalization relative to managers in industries 
with no tariffs. But, while interesting in itself, this could be driven by firms replacing managers 
with more skilled ones following the FTA. If firms are hiring more talented managers that 
require higher pay, then our result is a mixture of more skilled hires combined with changes in 
job scope. To address this, columns 2 through 4 include manager times division fixed effects (so 
that the effect is identified out of changes in pay of an individual in a division).
23 The results in 
column 2 for the level of pay are similar to those in column 1 suggesting that firms respond to 
increased competition, not by replacing existing managers with new, higher-skilled managers, 
but instead by paying existing managers more.
 This result is robust to controlling for manager 
specific linear trends in pay (column 3).
24 
One way to interpret this increase in pay along with the simultaneous reduction in depth and 
increase in span is that firms in more competitive environments are more likely to delegate 
authority from the senior most positions to division managers. The CEO may face greater time 
constraints as his span of control increases, thereby delegating more decision-making authority 
to division managers. The increase in division manager pay may be commensurate with the 
increase in responsibilities and job scope. However, in order to more convincingly make this 
                                                                                                                                                             
using an economic valuation similar to Black-Scholes that takes into account vesting, termination provisions, and 
the probability of achieving performance goals.   
23 Even though we do not know the identity of the manager filling the position (the unit of observation in the data is 
a position), for most divisions in our sample we can identify managerial turnover using changes in tenure for the 
position over time. Therefore these estimates are net of individual unobserved ability and division (and firm) 
permanent unobserved characteristics.   
24 These manager fixed effects also capture any other variables that determine wages and do not change over time 
such as gender differences and education. The individual trends also account for linear age and tenure effects.   29
argument, it is important to look at changes in performance-based pay and not just to changes to 
total pay. 
In conjunction with greater delegation of decision-making, firms may increase performance-
based pay to ensure that division managers make decisions that are optimal for the firm. It is 
often argued that delegation and incentive provision are complementary (Prendergast, 2002): in 
the absence of multi-tasking, delegating authority will be more productive for the firm the more 
incentives the division manager has to take initiative, collect information, and make the right 
decisions for the business unit.  
Column 4 of Table 4 assesses how the basic sensitivity of DM pay to division performance 
(as measured by the natural log of division sales) changes with trade liberalization. The 
estimated coefficient on division sales is the elasticity of pay to sales: we find that a 1 % increase 
in division sales (controlling for division employment and firm size) leads to a 0.098 % increase 
in pay. The coefficient of interest is on AvT*Post89*lnDiv Sales which reflects the effect of the 
trade liberalization on the performance pay sensitivity of division managers. The results indicate 
that the estimated performance pay sensitivity for DMs increased by more in industries with 
greater increases in competition. In particular, the sensitivity increases by 0.02 for the division in 
an industry with average tariffs (0.499*0.04) which reflects an increase in incentives. As 
mentioned above, we know from theoretical work that delegation and incentive provision are 
often complements.  So, the fact that performance pay sensitivities are increasing as the DM 
moves closer to the CEO suggests that the delayering is possibly accompanied by delegation. 
However, an important cost of excessive reliance on division level incentives is that DMs as 
agents are motivated by the performance of their division and not of the firm as a whole. While 
there are benefits of delegating decision-making, there are offsetting costs in the loss of   30
coordination across divisions. Division manager decisions/actions may impact other divisions 
(through internal capital market allocations, information sharing, or lack thereof, etc). In order to 
reduce the cost of delegation, firms may tie a larger fraction of incentives to overall firm 
performance and not just division-level performance. Of course, the power of firm level 
incentives is relatively low (since the manager only gets a small fraction of his contribution to 
firm level performance), but firms can use firm level incentives to induce coordination across 
divisions. 
In columns 5 through 7 of Table 4, we further evaluate changes in incentive provision by 
firms where now the dependent variable is the fraction of long-term incentives out of total pay 
that division managers receive. The results show that the trade liberalization led to a higher 
fraction of total pay in the form of long-term incentives for division managers. For the firm 
facing average tariffs, the increase in the share of long-term incentives is 3.5 % (0.882*0.04) 
relative to the average share of 28% for all division managers. Stronger links between pay and 
firm performance should encourage DMs to consider the effect of their decisions on overall firm 
performance and to coordinate their actions with other division managers. 
Finally, just as we can test for the sensitivity of DM pay to division performance, we can 
estimate its sensitivity to firm performance. We do this in column 8 of Table 4 where we use the 
log of total stock market value of the firm as our performance measure (includes dividends).
25 
Since the equation is in first differences, this estimates the change in log pay from increases in 
log stock returns (including dividends). The positive coefficient on the interaction term 
                                                 
25 We obtain similar results if we use log firm sales as the performance measure.   31
(AvT89*Post89*lnFirm Perf.) suggests that the sensitivity of DM pay to firm performance 
increased more in industries that faced greater competition after the liberalization.
26 
Table 4 shows that competition from the FTA triggered changes in both the level and 
performance sensitivity of pay for division managers: increased overall pay, increased sensitivity 
to division performance, as well as an increased importance of firm level performance in total 
compensation. This set of facts is consistent with the explanation that increased competition 
leads to a greater need to quickly adapt to local conditions. Firms respond by delegating 
authority to division managers. However, since delegation is costly because it exacerbates 
agency and coordination problems, firms increase the performance sensitivity of division 
manager pay, especially pay that is linked to firm performance.
  
The results so far show that the trade liberalization had an effect on a number of different 
organizational practices and strongly suggest that our organizational variables are highly 
complementary within firms. In fact, we found a strong correlation between the different 
practices in a regression framework, allowing for division fixed effects, division trends, and 
controls for division and firm size (see discussion in Section 3 and Table S5 in the Supplemental 
Appendix). Even though we do not observe returns to firm organizational choices, it seems that 
firms adjust organizational elements in a coordinated manner and redesign their organizations 
through a set of potentially complementary choices in response to changes in their 
environment.
27  
4.2.2  Heterogeneous Effects in R&D and Advertising-Intensive Industries 
                                                 
26 Although it is not the focus of the paper, we also analyzed the evolution of CEO pay following liberalization.  We 
found the changes in CEO pay to mirror those of division managers. Total CEO compensation and the fraction of 
long-term incentives in total pay (columns 3 and 4 in Table S3 in the Supplemental Appendix) increased more in 
highly affected industries after 1989.  
27 For example, changing one organizational design choice, such as moving the division manager closer to the top of 
the hierarchy may be more effective in improving firm performance when it occurs in conjunction with other design 
elements.  Hence, when division managers are closer to the top of the hierarchy, firms may provide stronger firm-
level incentives to encourage division managers to make decisions that enhance firm value.   32
     If the mechanism through which firms flatten their organizations is related to how decisions 
are made—either through improved flow of information or delegated decision-making—we 
might expect different responses to competition from firms operating in different industries. In 
particular, if firms delegate authority to more effectively exploit the informational advantage of 
the division manager relative to the CEO, we would expect more delegation to occur in 
industries where information about local markets is harder to communicate, such as industries 
characterized by high R&D and advertising intensity. In these industries, products are more 
likely to be differentiated with firms competing along the quality dimension. In contrast, firms 
offering homogeneous products generally compete on price where a low-cost position generates 
a competitive advantage. To capture the importance of product or quality differentiation, we 
characterize industries by the degree of spending on research and development (R&D) and 
advertising. In these industries, we might expect the value of quick decisions or adaptations to 
local markets to be greater relative to industries with homogeneous products. If so, then we 
should see stronger organizational responses to trade liberalization in firms operating in R&D 
and advertising-intensive industries. 
     To evaluate this, we classify firms as having a high R&D and advertising to sales ratio (where 
high refers to above median) using two different sources. From Compustat, we measure the 
average R&D plus advertising expenses over sales of the 4 digit SIC industry between 1986 and 
1988. We also used an alternative measure based on the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
1975 Line of Business Survey (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2008).  We report the results in the first 4 
columns of Table 5.  In columns 1 and 3 with depth as the dependent variable, we find a negative 
and significant coefficient on the three-way interaction term (AvT89*Post89*High R&D+ADV).  
This implies that for a given tariff reduction, firms in a high R&D and advertising industry will   33
reduce depth by more. Turning to division manager pay (columns 2 and 4), we find a positive 
coefficient on the interaction term, although the coefficient is statistically significant only when 
using the Compustat measure.  These results suggest that firms in response to trade liberalization 
delayer their hierarchies by moving DMs closer to the CEO and increase their pay, particularly if 
they operate in R&D and advertising-intensive industries. They also highlight the fact that firms 
change different organizational practices together, in a coordinated way. We interpret this 
finding to be consistent with firms changing the way in which they make decisions either 
through improved transmission of information or delegation of authority.  
4.2.3  Changes in Costs and Firm Scope 
In the two sub-sections above, we present evidence that is generally consistent with firms 
restructuring their organizations to alter the way in which decisions are made—either through 
increased delegation or improved transmission of information. Let us now explore other potential 
mechanisms. A simple explanation often provided for why firms reorganize is to downsize or cut 
costs. Under this line of reasoning, firms delayer and eliminate managerial positions (i.e., 
division managers move closer to the CEO) primarily to cut costs -- the reorganization has little 
to do with changes in how decisions are made. To evaluate this, we consider our pay results in a 
different light. If the reorganizations were simply about cost-cutting, we would expect the level 
of division manager pay to decline with the trade liberalization. We find the opposite. However, 
these pay increases might be specific to division manager positions, and the firm may be 
eliminating other senior manager positions and/or reducing their pay. To evaluate this, we focus 
on the intermediary position between the CEO and the division manager for which we have some   34
information: the group manager. These managers have multiple profit center responsibility and 
are typically positioned between the CEO and the division manager.
28  
In column 5 of Table 5, we regress the number of group positions in the firm on our 
competition measure and include firm fixed effects and trends and control for firm size. We find 
that the trade liberalization reduces the number of group managers (although not statistically 
significant). So, there is some (weak) evidence of downsizing: firms are reducing the number of 
group managers in the face of greater competition. But, to really shed light on the downsizing 
explanation, we need to ask:  what is happening to the pay of these group managers? If firms are 
cutting costs, we would expect pay to be declining. Again, we find the opposite. In column 6, the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the total wage bill for the group positions (i.e., the number 
of group managers * total compensation per group manager). We find a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient suggesting that, while firms may be reducing the number of group 
positions, they are increasing their average pay faster in industries facing more competition. This 
is also at odds with cost-cutting. But, firms may also be cutting pay of other senior executive 
positions. To address this, in column 7 we define the dependent variable as the logarithm of total 
pay for a group of senior executive positions (CEO, group managers, division managers, CFO, 
General Counsel, Head of Human Resources, and Head of Strategic Planning). We find that 
trade liberalization has a positive and significant effect on the pay of this larger group of 
executives. Since we do not observe labor costs for all senior management positions, it still could 
be that firms eliminate and reduce pay of other positions. Never-the-less, the documented 
                                                 
28 In the paper, we do not focus on the group manager position for several reasons. First, not all firms report them:  
they are more likely to appear in larger, more diversified firms.  Second, since group managers are defined on the 
basis of their position in the hierarchy (proximity to CEO and COO), it is harder to infer facts about depth or 
responsibility from their position. By contrast, division managers are defined on the basis of their responsibility, and 
hence we can infer more about hierarchies from where they are placed.    35
increases in senior management pay in response to the trade liberalization are inconsistent with 
the simple explanation of cost-cutting.   
Another explanation for some of the changes that we observe is that firms broaden their 
scope. For example, firms may diversify into more businesses as the result of the liberalization –
maybe to diversify risk- and as a result span of control increases as the additional business unit 
managers report directly to the CEO. We use the Herfindahl index of sales across different 2 
digit segments, as an inverse measure of firm diversification, and find evidence against the 
diversification story: multidivisional firms tend to decrease scope and focus their business 
operations (become less diversified) in the presence of increased competition. Column 8 in Table 
5 shows this result. 
Since many of these firms have multinational operations, and some are likely to have 
Canadian subsidiaries before 1989, we tried to test whether their choice of being located in 
Canada changed with the liberalization. If U.S. firms created Canadian subsidiaries because of 
trade barriers, we might expect the benefits of local presence in Canada to disappear with freer 
trade. Column 9 presents the results where the dependent variable is the number of Canadian 
subsidiaries of the firm. We only have information for 1988 and 1993, and therefore rely on the 
change between the two years. Even though we find a negative sign (firms for whom the 
reduction in tariffs was greatest reduced the number of subsidiaries), it is not significant,
29 so it is 
hard to ascribe the main effect we find on depth and span to this explanation. 
These results are suggestive of firms responding in a variety of ways to the trade 
liberalization. These include focusing on their core businesses and rationalizing the location of 
their operations. The findings on flattening that we establish in this paper are possibly part of the 
implementation of this new corporate strategy.  
                                                 
29 This is consistent with the results in Feinberg and Keane (2001).    36
5. Conclusion   
Conventional wisdom and recent empirical evidence suggest that firm hierarchies are 
flattening— hierarchies have fewer levels and broader spans of control. What are the possible 
explanations for the flattening of firms?  Do hierarchies flatten because of the adoption of 
information technology, changes in work practices or managerial skill, or new plans for firm 
strategy and shifts in business mix?  Many have argued that increased competition from 
globalization has driven firms to search for new organizational forms to replace traditional 
hierarchical structures.  In this paper, we focus on this explanation.  
The main contribution of the paper is to establish a causal effect between increased foreign 
competition measured by the trade liberalization between Canada and the U.S. and the flattening 
of firms. We use a unique panel-dataset of organizational practices that allows us to identify our 
results from variation within divisions and firms over time, and not from cross-sectional 
differences. Since the trade liberalization was bilateral, it also implied a reduction in Canadian 
tariffs on U.S. exports potentially leading to market expansion opportunities for our U.S. firms. 
But, our findings suggest that it is increased competition that causes firms to reorganize rather 
than greater market expansion opportunities.  
We find that U.S. firms in manufacturing industries more exposed to the trade liberalization 
reduce the number of hierarchical levels, broaden the span of control for the CEO, and radically 
change the structure of compensation of division managers with more incentives based on 
division performance as well as on firm performance. Thus, the firms in our sample appear to 
change a number of practices simultaneously following a shock to their economic environment 
which is consistent with theories of complementarities in organizational practices. It is the   37
simultaneous change of these complementary practices that allows us to provide an interpretation 
for the reasons behind firms’ choices. 
Our evidence suggests that firms may be fundamentally altering how decisions are being 
made. While we do not directly observe changes in decision-making, the greater importance of 
performance-based pay for division managers in conjunction with closer proximity to the CEO is 
consistent with this interpretation. Moreover, stronger organizational responses by firms in R&D 
and advertising-intensive industries—where firms compete through product differentiation--is 
also consistent with changes in decision-making. To the extent that competition increases the 
value of quick and responsive decision-making, firms can eliminate layers to improve the quality 
and speed of the transmission of information or increase the authority of division managers to 
become more adaptive to local information. Delegation is then accompanied by an increase in 
local (division-based) incentives since these tend to be complementary practices. However, since 
delegation and local incentives come at the cost of less coordination across divisions, firms also 
raise the power of global incentives (based on total firm performance). Furthermore, the 
broadening in the CEO’s span of control possibly enabled more accurate transmission of 
information and a more important coordinating role for the CEO. Our findings are generally 
consistent with this account of the evolution of complementary choices as a response to an 
external shock. 
We also explore a number of other explanations for our results, the simplest one being cost-
cutting by firms. However, we find that pay of division managers (and other senior management 
positions) increases in more competitive environments which seems at odds with the simple cost-
cutting explanation.    38
Finally, we only identify one channel for the flattening of firms, and there are possibly many 
others, such as the increased availability of IT. Moreover, firms may be responding to the new 
competitive environment along other dimensions, with the changes in organization being 
complementary. We find some evidence that, in response to competition, firms “refocus” on core 
competencies and become less diversified. Further investigation of how organizational structure 
interacts with other corporate responses and the overall impact of these changes on firm 
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Figure 1 An Example of a Hierarchy: Span and Depth 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean  S.D.  #  Observations 
      
Division level variables:      
Div.Depth 1.432  0.791  6396 
ln DM Tot.Comp.  12.729  0.66  6396 
Share LT Incent.  0.29  0.157  6396 
ln Div.Empl.  -0.033  1.42  5857 
ln Division Sales  12.454  1.404  5869 
IT invest (2digit)  0.054  0.041  6396 
CT Invest.  0.021  0.016  6396 
      
Firm level variables:      
CEO span  5.473  2.82  1962 
lnCEO comp.  14.629  0.778  1962 
CEO LT/Total  0.435  0.187  1962 
ln Firm Sales  8.296  1.228  1962 
lnFirm Performance  8.095  1.596  1902 
# Group Mgrs.  2.7  1.596  1450 
ln Pay Group Mgrs.  14.91  0.846  1445 
ln Pay Senior Exec.  16.03  0.692  1445 
Segment HHI  0.761  0.243  1941 
#Can. Subsid  2.413  3.046  1459 
      
Trade variables:      
AvT89 0.039  0.041  1962 
Export: AvT89  0.053  0.065  1962 
           
Notes:  Div. Depth is the number of managers between the DM and the CEO; ln DM Tot Comp. is the log of Div. 
Manager total pay; Share LT Incent. is the fraction of long term incentives over Div. Manager total pay;  IT invest 
(CT invest) is the annual change in IT (Communication Technologies) capital stock at 2 digit SIC from BEA data; 
CEO Span is the number of managers that report directly to the CEO; lnCEO comp. is the log to total CEO pay; 
CEO LT/Total is  the fraction of long term incentives over total CEO pay;  ln Firm Performance is log total  
market value for the year including stock returns and dividends;    # Group Mgrs is the number of group managers 
between the DM and the CEO; ln Pay Group Managers is # Group managers multiplied by group manager's 
average pay (in logs); ln Pay Senior Exec. is the log of pay for CEO, group managers, division managers, CFO, 
General Counsel, Head of Human Resources, and Head of Strategic Planning; Segment HHI is the Herfindahl 
index of 2 digit segment sales (inverse measure of diversification);    AvT89 is the average US tariff rate on 
Canadian imports in 86-88, by industry. Export: AvT89 is the Canadian Tariff on US exports (see Table A3 for 
more details and sources). 
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Table 2: Division Depth and Trade Liberalization 
    Div.Depth Div.Depth Div.Depth Div.Depth Div.Depth Div.Depth Div.Depth  Div.Depth  Div.Depth  Div.Depth 
        Placebo  Timing  Weighted  Same SIC  Change CEO  IT  CT 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8  9  10 
AvT89*Post89 -3.661 -3.501 -3.73    -3.501  -4.069  -5.084 -3.279 -3.539  -3.739 
 [1.191]***  [1.190]***  [1.147]***    [1.196]***  [2.079]* [1.322]*** [1.177]*** [1.177]***  [1.118]*** 
Export:  AvT89*Post89    0.655            
      [0.894]            
AvT89*Post88(placebo)     1.5           
       [1.443]            
AvT94*Post94        2.622          
        [1.868]          
LAGAvT89*Post89      0.711          
        [1.323]          
Change of 
C E O            - 0 . 1 8 2      
           [0.025]***     
IT invest 
(2digit)             4.981  
             [ 3 . 6 9 3 ]   
CT  Invest.             56.901 
               [17.044]*** 
ln  Firm  Sales 0.238  0.216 0.216 0.217 0.217 0.231 0.082  0.231  0.2  0.185 
  [0.145]  [0.120]* [0.121]* [0.123]* [0.126]* [0.122]* [0.138]  [0.122]*  [0.113]*  [0.109]* 
ln  Div.Empl.    -0.07  -0.07 -0.071  -0.068 -0.07 -0.087  -0.068  -0.07  -0.07 
    [0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.019]***  [0.024]*** [0.019]*** [0.019]***  [0.019]*** 
Division  FE Yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes  yes  yes 
Division  trends  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 6396  5702 5702 5702 5538 5687 3818  5661  5702  5702 
R-squared  0.016  0.031 0.03 0.026  0.033  0.029  0.039  0.062  0.033  0.043 
Number  of  Divisions  1524 1524 1524 1480 1523 1031  1517  1524  1524 
Notes: Std. Errors in brackets, clustered by industry (SIC4). All regressions include year dummies and the interaction of Post89 with US industry skill intensity, capital intensity 
and TFP growth pre-89 to account for tariff endogeneity. Div Depth is the number of managers between the DM and the CEO. AvT89 (AvT94) is the average US tariff rate on 
Canadian imports in 86-88 (90-93), by industry. Column 3 also includes the Canadian tariff on US exports. Column 6 uses weighted averages of tariffs on Canadian imports by 
firm where the weights are the 1988 fractions of sales in the firm’s different segments; Column 7 restricts the sample to firms that do not change primary SIC; Change CEO is a 
dummy variable indicating a CEO change;  see notes to Table 1 for definition of other variables.   45
Table 3: CEO Span of Control and Trade Liberalization 
   CEO Span  CEO Span  CEO Span  CEO Span  CEO Span  CEO Span  CEO Span  CEO Span  CEO Span 
        Placebo  Timing  Weighted  Same SIC  Change CEO  IT 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8  9 
AvT89*Post89 8.106  9.908  11.386    11.314  12.814  11.961  9.89  9.777 
 [3.613]**  [3.839]**  [3.590]***    [3.724]*** [5.038]**  [5.858]**  [3.739]***  [3.883]** 
Export:  AvT89*Post89     -3.544          
     [3.529]          
AvT89*Post88(placebo)       -5.61         
      [4.601]         
AvT94*Post94         -0.507         
         [4.256]        
LAGAvT89*Post89         -5.556         
         [3.429]        
Change  of  CEO          0.446   
          [0.133]***   
IT  invest  (2  digit)            16.904 
            [20.164] 
ln Firm Sales  0.461  0.947  0.961  0.959    0.933  0.586  0.918  0.951 
 [0.262]*  [0.294]***  [0.294]***  [0.290]***   [0.292]***  [0.383]  [0.280]***  [0.292]*** 
Firm  FE  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes  Yes 
Firm  trends    yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes  Yes 
Observations  1962 1962 1962 1962 1929 1962 1403  1957  1962 
R-squared  0.015  0.021  0.021 0.02 0.022 0.02 0.027  0.031  0.021 
Number  of  firms  230 230 230 230 227 230 173  229  230 
Notes: Std. Errors in brackets, clustered by industry (SIC4). All regressions include year dummies and the interaction of Post89 with US industry skill intensity, capital 
intensity and TFP growth pre-89 to account for tariff endogeneity.  Span is the number of managers that report directly to the CEO. AvT89 (AvT94) is the average US 
tariff rate on Canadian imports in 86-88 (90-93), by industry. Column 3 also includes the Canadian tariff on US exports. Column 6 uses weighted averages of tariffs on 
Canadian imports by firm where the weights are the 1988 fractions of sales in the firm’s different segments; Column 7 restricts the sample to firms that do not change 
primary SIC; Change CEO is a dummy variable indicating a CEO change; see notes to Table 1 for definition of other variables. 
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Table 4:  Division Manager (DM) Compensation  


















    1  2  3  4  5 6 7 8 
AvT89*Post89 1.751  1.829  1.817  -5.015  0.882  0.901  0.988  -3.107 
 [0.629]***  [0.558]***  [0.564]***  [3.378]  [0.292]*** [0.308]*** [0.314]***  [2.071] 
lnDivision  Sales        0.098      
        [0.032]***      
(AvT89*Post89)*lnDiv  Sales        0.499      
        [0.244]**      
lnFirm Performance                0.112 
         (stock returns)              [0.044]** 
(AvT89*Post89)*1nFirm Perf.                0.491 
               [0.244]** 
ln Firm Sales  0.18  0.195  0.222  0.185  0.026  0.027  0.017  0.105 
 [0.034]***  [0.035]***  [0.046]***  [0.047]*** [0.016] [0.017] [0.023]  [0.057]* 
ln  Div.Empl.  0.109  0.103  0.089  0.058      
  [0.011]***  [0.012]***  [0.012]***  [0.013]***      
1n  Div.  Sales          0.014 0.013 0.012 0.105 
         [0.004]***  [0.005]**  [0.007]*  [0.026]*** 
Division  FE  yes      yes     
Indiv*Div  FE    yes  Yes  yes    yes yes yes 
Indiv*Div Trend      Yes  yes      yes  yes 
Observations  5718  4737  4737  4560  5842 4836 4836 4739 
R-squared  0.165  0.183  0.148  0.164  0.05  0.054 0.051 0.161 
Number  of  Divisions  1460  1460  1460  1405  1494 1494 1494 1462 
Notes:   Std. Errors in brackets, clustered by industry (SIC4). All regressions include year dummies, interactions between AvT89 and each performance measure 
and interactions between Post89 and each performance measure, and the interaction of Post89 with US industry skill intensity, capital intensity and TFP growth 
pre-89 to account for tariff endogeneity.  Share LT Incent. is the fraction of long term incentives over Div. Manager total pay. AvT89 is the average tariff rate on 
Canadian imports in 86-88, by industry.  ln DM Tot Comp. is the log of Div. Manager total pay.  AvT89 is the average US tariff rate on Canadian imports in 86-
88, by industry. 1nFirm performance is log total stock market returns including dividends. See notes to table 1 for definition of other variables.   47
 
Table 5: Possible Explanations for Flattening 











   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
AvT89*Post89 -0.17  0.121  2.755  1.573  -1.07  2.35  1.31  0.57  -10.34 
 [2.150]  [1.036]  [1.700]  [1.039]  [2.28]  [0.79]***  [0.51]**  [0.22]***  [7.05] 
AvT89*Post89* 
High R&D+ADV  -5.41  3.254  -7.989  0.845           
 [2.393]**  [1.123]***  [2.028]***  [1.351]           
Post89*High R&D+ADV  0.303  -0.166  0.235  -0.06           
 [0.125]**  [0.050]***  [0.124]*  [0.057]           
             
Source for R&D+ADV Intensity  Compustat 86-88  FTC Report 1975          
                  
Division FE & Trends  yes  yes  yes  yes           
Firm FE           yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Firm trends          yes  yes  yes  yes    
Observations 5349  5365  5074  5090  1349  1341  1341  1941  1459 
R-squared 0.035  0.135  0.045  0.128  0.02  0.03  0.13  0.04  0.01 
Number of Firms          191  191  191  230  158 
Number of Divisions  1434  1440  1364  1370                
Notes: Std. Errors in brackets, clustered by industry (SIC4). All regressions include year dummies, ln firm sales and the interaction of Post89 with US industry 
skill intensity, capital intensity and TFP growth pre-89 to account for tariff endogeneity. AvT89 is the average US tariff rate on Canadian imports in 86-88, by 
industry.  High R&D+ADV is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm operates in a 4 digit sic industry with an above median ratio of R&D plus advertising 
expenses to sales (1986-1988).  Columns 1 to 4 control for ln division employment. See notes to table 1 for definition of other variables. 
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Table A1:  Effect of the Trade Liberalization on Stock Returns, Employment and Average Price Cost Margins 




1n Firm Employ 
3 






AvT89*Post89 0.441  1.244  0.175  0.056  -0.089  -0.258 
 [1.015]  [1.310]  [0.279]  [0.384] [0.065]  [0.083]*** 
Export: AvT89*Post89  1.612  1.451  0.483  0.559  0.023  0.059 
 [0.611]***  [0.656]**  [0.154]*** [0.178]***  [0.030]  [0.050] 
Firm FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Firm trends  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sample all  main>50%  all  main>50%  all  main>50% 
Observations 1838  1411  1954  1499  1962  1508 
R-squared 0  0  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.04 
Number of firms  217  173  230  184  230  184 
Notes: Std. Errors in brackets, clustered by industry (SIC4). All regressions include year dummies.  The dependent variables are the excess stock market returns 
(col. 1 and 2), the log of total firm employment (col. 3 and 4), and average price cost margin (col. 5 and 6); AvT89 is the average tariff rate on Canadian imports 
in 86-88 by industry (Export: AvT89 for U.S. exports respectively). Columns 2, 4 and 6 restrict the sample to firms whose largest segment represented at least 
50% of sales before the liberalization (in 1988). 
 
 
Table A2:  Correlation between Organizational and Competition Variables 














Competition Variable  2.822  0.14  -0.781  -21.927  0.128  -0.01 
 [1.304]**  [0.067]**  [0.362]** [9.384]** [0.367]  [1.448] 
Division FE& trends  yes  yes  yes       
Firm FE& trends        yes  yes  yes 
Observations 4503  5600  4018  1378  2046  1196 
Number of Div.  1161  1500  1100       
R-squared 0.021  0.014  0.02  0.025  0.009  0.011 
Number of Firms           157  258  156 
Notes: Std. Errors in brackets, clustered by industry (SIC4). All regressions include year dummies. Trade costs are the sum of tariff and transport costs by 
industry, Lerner index is the industry average price cost margin (4 digit SIC), and import penetration is the percentage of imports out of total domestic 
consumption by 4 digit industry. Columns 2 and 5 include firms in services and manufacturing, while 1, 3, 4 and 6 are restricted to manufacturing industries. 
See Table A3 for exact definitions and sources. 
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Table A3: Additional Firm and Industry Data 
 
ln Firm Performance/  
ln Firm Sales/  
ln Firm Employment 
Natural log of total market value at the end of the year, calculated as 
number of shares outstanding times stock price at calendar year end and 
dividends per share. (in million dollars)/ Natural logarithm of firm sales 
(in million dollars)/ Natural log of total firm employees (in thousands).  
Source: Compustat. 
U.S. industry average 
skill intensity/  
U.S. industry average 
capital intensity/ 
 TFP growth 
Ratio of non-production to production workers by industry/ ratio of Total 
capital expenditure to Total employment/4-factor TFP annual growth rate; 
for all 3 measures, we take the average for 1986-1988  
Bartelsman, et al (1996).  The NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry 
Database (1958-1996) 
IT (CT) Investment  Change in the logarithm of average real stock of the components of 
Information Technology (Communication Technology) capital, per year 
and industry (at 2 digit SIC). IT includes hardware, software and 
communication equipment. Data are estimates of real non-residential 
fixed assets (all corporations and proprietorships) from Detailed Fixed 
Assets Tables available on the BEA website.  Series are adjusted using 
the quality-adjusted PPI deflator.  
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
 
R&D and Advertising 
intensity 
Average R&D plus advertising expenses over sales (1) of the 4 digit SIC 
industry between 1986 and 1988 from Compustat. (2)  based on the U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 1975 Line of Business Survey  
Source: Compustat and U.S. FTC 1975 Line of Business Survey 
HHI Segment  Herfindhal index (HHI) of 2 digit segment sales is the sum of squared 
shares of each reported segment sales over total sales. Business Segments 
are declared by firms that report the industries they operate in.  
Source: Compustat Business Segment data. 
Excess stock returns  Computed as the difference between calendar year company and market 
returns. Company returns are compounded daily and include all 
dividends. Total market returns are CRSP’s NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
market weighted returns.  
Source: CRSP 
Avg.PCM  Average price cost margin [=(firm sales-cost of sales)/firm sales].  
Source: Compustat. 
Trade Costs  Sum of import tariff and transport costs by industry.  
Source: Bernard et al. (2006) 
Import Penetration  Import Penetration by industry.  
Source: Bernard et al. (2006). 
Lerner  index  Approximated as the industry average price cost margin based on all 
Compustat firms.  
Source: Compustat. 
Number of Canadian 
Subsidiaries by Firm 
Source: Directory of Corporate Affiliations 




1. Supplemental Figure  
 
Figure S1:  Textile Manufacturer:  Changes in Hierarchy pre-FTA versus post-FTA 
































Division Division A Division Division D
CCEOEO CEO
Division Division C







Pre-FTA (1988) Post-FTA (1991)
 
Span = number of positions reporting to CEO 
Depth = number of positions between the CEO and Division Manager   51
2.  Supplemental Tables 
 
Table S1: Top 20 Industries with High U.S. Tariffs on Canadian Imports 
US SIC 87 
(3-digit) Industry  Name 
U.S. Tariffs on Canadian 
Imports 
1986-1988 Average 
302  Rubber & Plastics Footwear  36.06% 
233  Women’s, Misses, Juniors Outerwear  21.55% 
211 Cigarettes  19.33% 
225 Knitting  Mills  16.81% 
282  Plastics, Syn. Resins, Syn. Rubber, Cellulosic, Other 
Fibers, Ex. Glass 
11.26% 
202 Dairy  Products  10.46% 
314  Footwear, Except Rubber  10.01% 
203  Canned, Frozen, Preserved Fruit & Vegetables  9.76% 
287 Agricultural  Chemicals 9.76% 
221  Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Cotton  8.81% 
364  Electric Lighting & Wiring Equipment  7.29% 
201 Meat  Products  7.16% 
382  Lab. App., Analytical, Optical, Measuring & Controlling 
Instruments 
6.94% 
208 Beverages  6.77% 
366  Telephone & Telegraph Apparatus  6.61% 
375  Motorcycles, Bicycles & Parts  6.38% 
284 Soap,  Detergent,  Cleaning Preparation, Perfumes, 
Cosmetics, & Other 
6.13% 
267  Converted Paper, Paperboard Products, Except Boxes  5.97% 
329  Abrasive, Asbestos, Misc. Nonmetallic Mineral Products  5.83% 
384  Surgical, Medical, & Dental Instruments & Supplies  5.72% 
    
 The third column shows the tariff faced by firms in the sample and used in the analysis, averaged by industry (3 digit SIC). 
 
 
Table S2: Examples of Canadian Companies in High Tariff Industries 
US SIC 87 
(3-digit) Industry  Name 
U.S. Tariffs on 
Canadian Imports 
1986-1988 Average 
Examples of Canadian 
Companies 
(Sales in U.S. $) 
211  Cigarettes  19.33%  Imperial Tobacco ($4.2 b) 
Rothman’s ($400 m) 
225  Knitting Mills  16.81%  Dominion Textiles ($1.4 b) 
282  Plastics, Syn. Resins, Syn. 
Rubber, Cellulosic, Other 
Fibers, Ex. Glass 
 
11.26%  Nova Chemicals ($4.8 b) 
208  Beverages  6.77%  Seagram ($4.5 b)  
Molson ($2.1 b) 
366  Telephone & Telegraph 
Apparatus 
6.61%  Nortel Networks ($6.1 b) 
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Table S3: Other results 
   %Sales represented  Change CEO  Ln CEO Comp.  CEO LT/Total 
   1  2  3  4 
AvT89*Post89 0.597  0.474  2.544  0.906 
 [0.620]  [1.297]  [0.615]***  [0.257]*** 
ln Firm Sales    0.032  0.347  0.002 
   [0.106]  [0.079]***  [0.035] 
Firm FE  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Firm trends  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 1920  1960  1965  1965 
R-squared 0.007  0.012  0.071 0.02 
Number of firms  232  231  232  232 
Notes: Std. Errors in brackets, clustered by industry (SIC4). All regressions include year dummies. The 
dependent variable in col.1 is the percentage of sales from divisions available in the Hewitt data, out of total 
firm sales; in col.2 it is the dummy variable for whether the firm changed CEO in that year; in col.3 it is the 
log of total CEO Pay, and in col.4 the share of long-term incentives out of total pay. AvT89 is the average US 
tariff rate on Canadian imports in 86-88, by industry. 
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Table S4: Robustness Checks 
Panel A: Division Depth 
    Div.Depth Div.Depth Div.Depth Div.Depth Div.Depth 
  In 1988  Incl. Serv.    No Subsid.  Fast 
    1 2 3 4 5 
AvT89*Post89  -3.49 -3.21  -3.398 -5.7 -5.491 
  [1.199]*** [1.248]** [1.259]***  [4.017]  [1.245]*** 
Exch.Rate*OriginImp.Pen.     0.806    
     [1.190]    
Division  FE  Yes yes yes yes Yes 
Division  trends  yes yes yes yes Yes 
Observations  5631 6965 5702 1150 1697 
Number  divisions  1490 1895 1524  290  509 
R-squared  0.032 0.023 0.032 0.118 0.084 
       
Panel B: CEO Span of Control 
   CEO Span  CEO Span  CEO Span  CEO Span  CEO Span 
  In 1988  Incl. Serv.    No Subsid.  Fast 
    1 2 3 4 5 
AvT89*Post89 8.874  7.545  10.453  21.576  5.648 
  [3.972]** [  4.025]* [4.155]**  [10.532]**  [6.926] 
Exch.Rate*OriginImp.Pen.     4.649    
     [7.736]    
Firm  FE  yes yes yes yes Yes 
Firm  trends  yes yes yes yes Yes 
Observations  1914 2711 1962  339  531 
Number of firms  222  340  230  42  65 
R-squared  0.021 0.019 0.021 0.114 0.059 
Notes: Std. Errors in brackets, clustered by industry (SIC4). All regressions include year dummies. All regressions also 
include the interaction of Post89 with US industry skill intensity, capital intensity and TFP growth pre-89 to account for 
tariff endogeneity (except col. 2 because these are not available for services industries). Div Depth is the number of 
managers between the DM and the CEO. AvT89 is the average US tariff rate on Canadian imports in 86-88, by 
industry. Exch.Rate*OriginImp.Pen is the bilateral Canada U.S. dollar exchange rate multiplied by the level of import 
penetration of the industry in 1988, Source: IMF-IFS and Bernard et al. (2006) .Column 1 restricts the sample to firms 
present in the sample as of 1988; col. 2 also includes services firms in the estimation, with AvT89=0; col. 3 includes 
the interaction of the Canada-US exchange rate and the level of import penetration in the industry before 1989; col. 4 
restricts the sample to firms that report zero Canadian subsidiaries in 1988; col. 5 restricts the sample to firms in 
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3.  Complementarities in Organizational Design  
 
In Table S5 (below), we correlate the different practices in a regression framework, allowing 
for division fixed effects, division trends, and controls for division and firm size. 
We find strong correlations between these variables. For example, each additional layer 
between the CEO and the division manager is associated with a decrease in division manager 
pay: a 7.2% decline in the logarithm of total compensation (column 1) and a 1.2% decline in the 
share of long-term incentives to total compensation (column 2). Depth and span are also strongly 
negatively correlated (columns 3 and 4). As firms move division managers closer to the top, the 
span of the CEO increases. And, this is not a purely “mechanical” result. In column 4, we find 
that depth is related to the number of DM positions that report to the CEO excluding the own 
division (thereby removing the purely mechanical part of the correlation) as well as to the 
number of senior functional positions that report directly to the CEO (such as the CFO, General 
Counsel, Chief Information Officer, Head of Human Resources, etc.).  
 With regard to pay and span, the results are more subtle (columns 5 through 8). While 
division manager pay and incentives are positively related to the number of other division 
managers reporting directly to the CEO, they are negatively related to the number of functional 
managers reporting directly to the CEO. This suggests that division positioning in the hierarchy 
and managerial pay are complements, but interestingly, that senior staff positioning and division 
manager pay are substitutes. One plausible explanation for this finding is that when senior staff 
managers report directly to the CEO and certain functions are centralized, their increase in 
authority comes at the expense of division manager authority and job scope. 
In sum, the strong correlations found between CEO span of control, division depth and the 
design of division manager compensation are consistent with the view that these organizational 
choices are indeed complements. Moreover, the trade liberalization, as an exogenous shock to 
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    1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 
Div.Depth -0.072  -0.012            
 [0.014]***  [0.006]*             
CEO Span      -0.063    -0.006    0   
     [0.012]***    [0.004]    [0.002]   
#DM dir. 
excl.own      -0.126    0.014    0.009 
       [0.020]***    [0.007]**    [0.004]** 
# FUNCT.Direct        -0.015    -0.011    -0.004 
       [0.009]*    [0.006]*    [0.002]** 
ln Firm Sales  0.216  0.022  0.237  0.231  0.199  0.197  0.023  0.018 
 [0.051]***  [0.021]  [0.101]**  [0.103]**  [0.053]*** [0.054]***  [0.021]  [0.021] 
ln  Div.Empl.  0.093  0.02 -0.067  -0.069 0.099  0.099  0.021  0.021 
 [0.011]***  [0.003]***  [0.017]***  [0.017]***  [0.011]*** [0.011]***  [0.003]***  [0.003]*** 
Division  FE  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes yes  yes 
Division  trends  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes yes  yes 
Observations  5702 5702  5702  5702  5718  5702 5718  5702 
Number  of  Div.  1524 1524  1524  1524  1530  1524 1530  1524 
R-squared  0.14 0.048  0.102  0.077  0.127  0.13 0.045  0.053 
Notes: Std. Errors in brackets, clustered by firm. All regressions include year dummies. ln DM Tot Comp. is the log of Div. Manager total pay. Div 
Depth is the number of managers between the DM and the CEO.  Span is the number of managers that report directly to the CEO.  #DM dir. excl.own is 
the number of DMs in the firm that report directly to the CEO excluding the own division.  # FUNCT.Direct is the number of senior functional positions 
that report directly to the CEO. Share LT Incent. is the fraction of long term incentives over Div. Manager total pay.  See notes to table 1 in the paper for 
definition of other variables. 
 
 
 